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can be best understood by what he calls “reconstructive separatism”; it is separatist
without associating itself with a worldless modern subject, and it is reconstructionist
without being an abstract postmodern “religion without religion.”His reading of new
phenomenology as a broadening of philosophy that allows for God-talk not only
provides a ﬁne analysis of what unites these disparate thinkers, but more germane to
the aims of his project, it shows that the kind of excising of theology from the
supposed neutral and presuppositionless domain of pure phenomenology advocated
by Janicaud and others mirrors the same desire to excise religion from the supposed
neutral, presuppositionless domain of the public square.
The third and ﬁnal part of the book, then, is devoted to tracing and extending the
insights of his reconstructive separatist reading of new phenomenology into politics.
The chapter entitled “Politics as an Ethico-Religious Task—Reconsidering Religion
in the Public Square” is, in my estimation, the real climax and most original research
of the book, where Simmons makes the compelling argument that politics is funda-
mentally an ethico-religious task of justice and not merely a space of neutral inter-
subjective interaction.
One possible criticism of this otherwise ﬁne tome is that in Simmons’s desire to
base politics on an ethico-religious vision and thereby show the relevance of new
phenomenology to the public square, he often appears to take liberties with their
thought. He introduces new terminology such as “ontology of constitutive respon-
sibility” and a “modest foundationalism” so as to provide a stabilized and sustain-
able ground and basis for selfhood, and he reads out of new phenomenology an
understanding of politics that is neither simply negative critique, nor an open-
ended and indeterminate utopian vision for the future, but also one of positive and
actual transformation of it. Not only do the terminology and the position seem at
odds or at least in tension with thinkers such as Levinas and Derrida, but as
Simmons himself recognizes, the discussion of politics as such is less explicit in
the works of Marion, Henry, and Lacoste. This is all to say, however, that Simmons
is engaged in the constructive task of extending their thoughts into new areas by
probing the possible import of their works for political theory. There are many
attempts to apply new phenomenologists too far and too quickly, but it seems to
me that Simmons’s work does so responsibly, carefully distinguishing where new
phenomenology ends and where he begins, and he does so plausibly. His work
combines a command of the literature in new phenomenology with a versatility
and creativity that offers suggestive new spaces for research. This book is recom-
mended not only to those with interests in new phenomenology but also to anyone
interested in the ongoing debate and discussion on what relationship, if any,
religion should have in the public sphere.
MICHAEL SOHN, Chicago, Illinois.
D’AVRAY, D. L. Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 214 pp. $29.95 (paper).
Some books on the history of knowledge make humble aims at proving the relevance
(or not) of a speciﬁc thinker, or rather one speciﬁc work of a thinker, in a well-
deﬁned period. Not this one. Take, for instance, the opening sentence: “The aim of
the present work is to develop a concept of value rationality that helps explain why
people hold on doggedly to their convictions; to balance this with observations on
how values nonetheless do change; to bring out the interdependence of instrumen-
tal and value rationality; to discredit special associations of formal rationality with
‘modernity’; and to show how value-driven instrumental reasoning draws lines
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between formal and substantive legal rationality” (1). Grand ambitions like these are
often made in a defensive mode. We are less rational than we think we are (or less
sophisticated, less learned than we used to be), or the opposite, freed from church
and psychological pressure, we represent the ultrarational and ultrapostmodern
spirit. But David d’Avray’s book is doing more here than exploring such boundaries
of rationality, and this book is not just another overview of the impact of Weber on
disciplinary thinking in the humanities. It should furthermore be added that this
book represents the second part of a diptych, the other “panel” bearing the title
Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis (also published by Cambridge
University Press in 2010).
Trained as a medievalist, the author raises in this double-edged project central
questions about historically determined tensions between religion and reason, which
he sees as a problem of globalization that is more complex than the analytical
tradition of Anglo-American scholarship allows for (11). The author’s background
as a scholar in medieval history proves to be useful in approaching this central
problem and allows him to raise questions that surpass the limits of both the
historical period and its traditional approaches. How far can rationality help us to
understand the “irrationality” of religion? What limits should we place on our
reinterpretation of it in a past that goes beyond the sunlit place of Enlightenment?
When Kant wrote “Everything in Nature operates according to laws” (ein jedes Ding der
Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen, as quoted by D’Avray on p. 16), he certainly did not have an
atheist in mind, but someone who should appreciate that the thing-in-itself is not
knowable. For Kant, I believe, the human faculty of thinking was to discuss its very
limits. Although he does not discuss the problem of the limits of knowledge in The
Critique of Pure Reason, David d’Avray does turn to the above-mentioned quote from
Kant in giving a rough sketch of a deﬁnition of rationality (D’Avray regularly insists
on the explicit essayistic character of his book). “Thus rationality,” he states, “will be
deﬁned here as thinking which involves some general principles and strives for
internal consistency” (16). After this statement, D’Avray turns swiftly to the other
side of the coin, to irrationality, molding the two separated categories into a kind of
unity in which the one feature adds a dimension to the other. Rationalities in History
does not argue that the world is getting more rational. It also provides some clues
why: its sketchy method offers, layer after layer, more understanding for the com-
plexity of what it is to know. It seems to me that the “Weberian comparison” D’Avray
draws serves more as an instrument to acquire insight into complexity of knowledge
than it serves as a dogmatic principle. D’Avray’s explanations range from the rational
choice theory and the apparently trivial prisoner’s dilemma, “which is actually quite close
to real life as well as to numerous police interrogations on television programmes”
(37), to momentous historical events like the sixteenth-century Council of Trent that
aimed to uniform the dogmatic structure of Catholic faith and to condemn Protes-
tantism (the Latin text of its congregation is provided as a whole in the annex,
189–96). Or from topics such as the “ethics and the formal rationality of traditional
Chinese law” (152) to “Hume, miracles and concrete thought” (89).
I said at the outset that D’Avray has written an ambitious book, and I ﬁrmly believe
that scholarship in the ﬁeld of humanities deserves more intellectually daring proj-
ects such as these, going beyond historically limited topics that treat more of the
same. In my view, people might respond to the widely divergent topics as raised by
D’Avray, with some quite pertinent questions. If the aim of exploring a history of
rationality is more important than ever, it also needs to be explored in a way that goes
beyond the twinned historiographical pillars of irrationality (or religion) and reason.
There is a lot of ambivalence about this question in Rationalities in History. On the one
hand, some of the “value rationalities” that d’Avray charts in chapters 2–4 have
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enhanced the rational nature of the Enlightenment and its founding effects on
modern thought (cf. Jonathan Israel, 84). On the other hand, D’Avray’s discussion
of miracles reveals sympathy for what he says is the credit of anthropology “making
sense of peculiar customs,” “but many . . . scholars will think in their heart of hearts
that Western rationality is superior because it allows for refutation by empirical
evidence” (83). More generally, David d’Avray is not ambivalent when it comes to
the importance of medieval doctrine such as that of Thomas Aquinas. Therefore, it is
difﬁcult to grasp the real scope and ambition of this book without the help of the
other part of his diptych project, regardless of the intellectual implications of his
thought experiment in this volume.
BABETTE HELLEMANS, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.
CUNNINGHAM, CONOR. Darwin’s Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists
Both Get It Wrong. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010. xx+543 pp. $35.00 (cloth).
With the 1990 publication of Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, John
Milbank launched “Radical Orthodoxy” onto the stage of contemporary religious
thought. This British-led theological movement seeks, on the one hand, to challenge
modern secularism by historicizing it within the context of Christianity and seeks, on
the other, to uphold the gains of modernity by grounding them within a patristic and
medieval orthodoxy. For instance, Theology and Social Theory devotes eleven chapters
to offering a historicized critique of modern political and social theory, interpreting
them as rooted in a series of late medieval theological errors, and then concludes by
outlining an Augustinian-type conception of the body politic, one that grounds the
modern afﬁrmation of the worldly in the divine. Milbank’s approach involves a
postmodern blurring of reason and revelation, what Henri de Lubac calls super-
naturalizing the natural. Radical Orthodoxy may thus be summarily described as a
postmodern attempt to rescue the modern world by reconnecting it to a premodern
ontology.
Conor Cunningham, one of Milbank’s former students at Cambridge and now one
of his colleagues at Nottingham, follows in the wake of Radical Orthodoxy by
focusing here on the legacy of Charles Darwin. If Darwin’s evolutionary insight is
one of the great gains of modernity, then this insight is gravely distorted both by
ultra-Darwinists, like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, and by misguided reli-
gious perspectives, which espouse creationism or intelligent design. In fact, these
polar alternatives are both rooted in modern positivism. This “unholy alliance of
atheists and religious fundamentalists,” declares Cunningham, “misconstrues Dar-
win’s theory,” which, if properly understood, is a “pious idea” that “is of great service
to Christian religion” (xvi). Though the book’s subtitle mentions both sides of this
“unholy alliance,” the volume is principally devoted to offering a sustained critique of
ultra-Darwinism, which Cunningham deﬁnes as the attempt to turn Darwin’s biolog-
ical insight into a universal philosophy. Akin to Theology and Social Theory, Cunning-
ham presents six chapters assessing various aspects of ultra-Darwinism followed by a
conclusion that retrieves patristic and medieval understandings of nature.
Speciﬁcally, chapter 1 introduces ultra-Darwinism as the “received view” in the
contemporary academy, one which turns Darwin’s thought into what Dennett fa-
mously calls a “universal acid” and one that Cunningham argues nihilistically dis-
solves all that it comes in contact with (1–4). Chapter 2 challenges Dawkins’s view
that the “selﬁsh gene” is the deﬁnitive unit of selection in nature. This “genic
reductionism” overstates the situation, for each level of nature, including human
activity, introduces its own genuine logic into the evolving natural equation (75–78).
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